|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]袁新岭,徐海成,卫俊良.非封闭式收费公路逃费的博弈分析[J].长安大学学报(社科版),2008,10(01):35-37.
　YUAN Xin-ling,XU Hai-cheng,WEI Jun-liang.Game analysis for dodging toll on unclosed toll road[J].Journal of Chang＇an University(Social Science Edition),2008,10(01):35-37.
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非封闭式收费公路逃费的博弈分析(PDF)
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《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

卷:
第10卷
期数:
2008年01期
页码:
35-37
栏目:
交通运输经济与管理
出版日期:
2008-03-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Game analysis for dodging toll on unclosed toll road
作者:
袁新岭; 徐海成; 卫俊良
长安大学 经济与管理学院,陕西 西安 710064
Author(s):
YUAN Xin-ling;  XU Hai-cheng;  WEI Jun-liang
School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an 710064, Shaanxi, China
关键词:
交通运输管理;  非封闭式收费公路;  收费标准;  逃费
Keywords:
transportation management;  unclosed toll road;  toll standard;  dodging toll
分类号:
F540
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为揭示非封闭式收费公路逃费的本质原因,规避逃费行为,运用博弈理论和期望矩阵模型对逃费现象进行分析。分析认为:在现有约束条件下,逃费者和参与逃费的村民、管理者在相互博弈中共谋逃费是其利益的最优选择。分析结果表明,治理逃费的根本途径在于降低公路收费标准,深化监管体制改革,科学布局公路收费站点。
Abstract:
Dodging toll on unclosed road is very difficult to control. It has seriously damaged the interests of investors and the development of China's road transport. To reveal the reasons for dodging and avoid it, this paper analyzes the phenomena of dodging the toll through game theory and game expectation matrix. The authors believe that in the current restrictions, dodging toll is the optimal selection in mutual game among the users, the villagers and managers.Therefore, the authors believe that reducing the toll standard, reforming the supervising and management system and setting up toll booth reasonably are the basic ways to solve this problem.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2007-09-18 作者简介:袁新岭(1979-),男,河南夏邑人,工学博士研究生。
更新日期/Last Update: 2008-03-20