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《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

卷:

第10卷

期数:

2008年02期

页码:

120-124

栏目:

法学研究

出版日期:

2008-06-20

文章信息/Info

Title:

Application of game theory for administrative punishment in road transportation

作者:

霍忠义¹; 李宏伟²; 韩东方²

1. 长安大学 理学院,陕西 西安 710064; 2. 长安大学 经济与管理学院,陕西 西安 710064

Author(s):

HUO Zhong-yi¹;  LI Hong-wei²;  HAN Dong-fang²

1. School of Science, Chang'an University, Xi'an 710064, Shaanxi, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University,Xi'an 710064, Shaanxi, China

关键词:

交通运输管理;  行政处罚;  混合战略博弈;  纳什均衡

Keywords:

traffic management;  administrative punishment;  mixed strategy game;  Nash equilibrium

分类号:

D922.11

DOI:

-

文献标志码:

A

摘要:

为研究博弈理论在道路运输行政处罚中的应用,运用纳什均衡理论,通过建立数学博弈模型,将道路违法行为主体与行政主管部门进行综合分析,分析认为,影响道路违法运输行为的主要因素是管理机构的检查概率直接影响运输主体违法行为发生的概率,并据此提出行政主管部门在博弈中取胜的五种策略,即从重处罚、降低检查成本、打击侥幸心理、提高管理队伍素质和加大宣传力度。

Abstract:

In order to study the application of game theory for administrative punishment in road transportation, the paper, with the help of Nash equilibrium and after the establishment of game model, conducts comprehensive analysis on the illegal actions on roads and roles of administrative departments. The analysis finds that the main reasons affecting illegal road actions are that the examination probability from the administrative departments directly influences the probability of illegal actions from the transportation undertakers. The authors in the paper propose five strategies for the departments:conducting severe puhishment, lowering examination cost, fighting against the psycology of chance luck, improving the personnel quality and strengthening publicity work.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:

收稿日期:2007-10-27 基金项目:西安市社科规划基金资助项目(08S17) 作者简介:霍忠义(1971-),男,陕西岐山人,讲师。

常用功能

更新日期/Last Update: 2008-06-20