|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]杨 伊.劳丹对“无奇迹论证”的质疑[J].长安大学学报(社科版),2013,15(01):79-83.
 YANG Yi.Confutations on No-Miracles-Argument by Laudan[J].Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition),2013,15(01):79-83.
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劳丹对“无奇迹论证”的质疑(PDF)
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《长安大学学报(社科版)》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

卷:
第15卷
期数:
2013年01期
页码:
79-83
栏目:
哲学
出版日期:
2013-03-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Confutations on No-Miracles-Argument by Laudan
作者:
杨 伊
武汉大学 哲学学院,湖北 武汉 430072
Author(s):
YANG Yi
School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China
关键词:
劳丹 无奇迹论证 悲观元归纳 科学实在论
Keywords:
Laudan NMA pessimistic meta-induction scientific realism
分类号:
N02
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
通过文献分析法,对劳丹质疑“无奇迹论证”进行研究。分析认为:“无奇迹论证”通过“溯因推理”(“回溯推理”)或“假说推理”的方法将科学在经验世界中所取得的成功作为科学理论具有真理性的最好理由,而劳丹等人针对此推理模式提出“悲观元归纳”论题,借用科学史中具体事件来揭示科学实在论的“无奇迹论证”推理方法所存在的问题,即科学理论的成功与该理论的真理性不存在因果必然联系。成熟科学理论中的核心词项有无指称,不需要该理论是否成功作为前提,而且一个理论在经验上的成功也并不保证其所有或者大多数核心词项均有指称。
Abstract:
The paper analyzed confutations on No-Miracles-Argument(NMA)by Laudan based on documental analysis. In the opinion of the supporters of No-Miracles-Argument, the best reason for the truth of a theory was the success itself in the real world. While Laudan puts forward his subject called Pessimistic Meta-Induction(PMI), as an opposite view of NMA, to reveal the crux of the infere-ntial model of NMA. That is there is no causal relation between the success of a theory and the truth of the same theory. There must be some certain referents adhere to the core terms in a mature science. Whether there is any referent of a theoretical core term or not independent of any premise of the success of the theory. Besides, the success of a theory can not guarantee that all or most core terms have any referents.

参考文献/References:

[1] Putnam H.Mathematics,matter and method[M].London:Cambridge University Press,1975.
[2]Laudan L.A confutation of convergent realism[J].Phil-osophy of Science,1981,48(1):21.
[3]Putnam H.Meaning and the moral sciences[M].London:Routledge & Kegan Press,1978.
[4]Lewis P J.Why the pessimistic inductions and the turnover fallacy[J].Synthese,2001,129(3):371-380.
[5]Psillos S.Scientific realism:how science tracks truth[M].London:Routledge,1999.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2013-01-03 作者简介:杨 伊(1983-),女,广西桂林人,哲学博士研究生。
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-03-20