|Table of Contents|

Game analysis for dodging toll on unclosed toll road(PDF)

《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:
2008年01期
Page:
35-37
Research Field:
交通运输经济与管理
Publishing date:
2008-03-20

Info

Title:
Game analysis for dodging toll on unclosed toll road
Author(s):
YUAN Xin-ling;  XU Hai-cheng;  WEI Jun-liang
School of Economics and Management, Chang'an University, Xi'an 710064, Shaanxi, China
Keywords:
transportation management;  unclosed toll road;  toll standard;  dodging toll
PACS:
F540
DOI:
-
Abstract:
Dodging toll on unclosed road is very difficult to control. It has seriously damaged the interests of investors and the development of China's road transport. To reveal the reasons for dodging and avoid it, this paper analyzes the phenomena of dodging the toll through game theory and game expectation matrix. The authors believe that in the current restrictions, dodging toll is the optimal selection in mutual game among the users, the villagers and managers.Therefore, the authors believe that reducing the toll standard, reforming the supervising and management system and setting up toll booth reasonably are the basic ways to solve this problem.

References:

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Memo

Memo:
-
Last Update: 2008-03-20