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Reputation Effect of the Professional Managers(PDF)

《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:
2006年01期
Page:
29-32，42
Research Field:
交通运输与管理
Publishing date:
2006-03-20

Info

Title:
Reputation Effect of the Professional Managers
Author(s):
ZHANG Xiong-lin;  HE Jin-sheng;  LIU Hong-wei
School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Keywords:
industrial and commercial management;  enterprise management;  professional manager;  reputation;  reputation effect;  managing mechanism about the reputation
PACS:
C931
DOI:
-
Abstract:
The reputation is promise which the person with the private information provides for the other person without the private information. As a kind of invisible capital, it presents the spilling effect and the path dependence. The reputaiton effect prompts the professional managers strongly and optimizes their efficiencies. If the game is repeated among the professional managers enough, the reputation behavior will appear. To maximize their long profits, the professional managers consider not only maximizing the present rewards but also the influences which the achievement and the reputation in the last period have on the reward in the next period. So it is indispensable to establish the professional managers' reputation mechanism which concludes establishing the professional managers' reputation records, fostering the professional manager's competitive market, providing the adaptive social circumstances and so on.

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Memo

Memo:
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Last Update: 2006-03-20