|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1]姚广宁,吴辉凡.国有商业银行贷款风险控制滞后的原因[J].长安大学学报(社科版),2007,9(02):46-50.
 YAO Guang-ning,WU Hui-fan.Reasons for risk control lagging in loaning from state-owned commercial banks[J].Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition),2007,9(02):46-50.
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国有商业银行贷款风险控制滞后的原因 (PDF)
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《长安大学学报(社科版)》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

卷:
第9卷
期数:
2007年02期
页码:
46-50
栏目:
应用经济学研究
出版日期:
2007-06-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Reasons for risk control lagging in loaning from state-owned commercial banks
作者:
姚广宁1吴辉凡2
1.西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安 710069; 2.广东金融学院金融系,广东广州 510521
Author(s):
YAO Guang-ning WU Hui-fan
1. School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xian 710069, Shaanxi, China; 2. Departwent of, Finance Guangdong Fince Institute, Guangzhou 510521, Guangdong, China
关键词:
经济学应用经济学金融学国有商业银行博弈
Keywords:
economics applied economics finance state-owned commercial banks game
分类号:
F830.33
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
基于委托-代理理论构建一个分支行博弈模型,分析国有商业银行对贷款风险控制滞后的 原因。研究认为,对基层代理人激励机制不足、代理人报酬体系缺乏风险揭示的激励、约束机制过 于僵化、行长任期不确定等是导致国有商业银行基层代理人缺乏对贷款风险控制的动机的原因。
Abstract:
On the basis of agency-by-mandate theory, the paper sets utp a game model for a branch bank and analysizes the reasons for risk control lagging in loaning from the state-owned commercial banks. The research shows that the deficiency for the stimulating mechanism of grass-root agents, the lack of income system of the agents that way reveal the risks, the rigidness of the restricting mechanism and the uncertainty of the posifion of banks are the main reasons that may lead to the low spirit of risk control motivation of the grass-root agents in state-owned commericl banks.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期:2007-01-26
作者简介:姚广宁(1964-),男,陕西西安人,高级工程师,经济学博士研究生。
更新日期/Last Update: 2007-06-20