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[1]刘乃郗,蒋铭哲.双重权衡机制下地方财政决策及其风险[J].长安大学学报(社科版),2020,22(05):55-65.
　LIU Naixi,JIANG Mingzhe.Local government fiscal decisionmaking and risks faced by it in the context of double tradeoff mechanism[J].Journal of Chang＇an University(Social Science Edition),2020,22(05):55-65.
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双重权衡机制下地方财政决策及其风险(PDF)
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《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

卷:
第22卷
期数:
2020年05期
页码:
55-65
栏目:
经济学
出版日期:
2020-09-15

文章信息/Info

Title:
Local government fiscal decisionmaking and risks faced by it in the context of double tradeoff mechanism
作者:
刘乃郗; 蒋铭哲
外交学院 国际经济学院，北京100037
Author(s):
LIU Naixi; JIANG Mingzhe
School of International Economics，China Foreign Affairs University，Beijing 100037，China
关键词:
双重权衡; 公共预算; 财政决策; 地方政府; 财政赤字; 经济增长; 转移支付
Keywords:
double tradeoff; public budget; fiscal decisionmaking; local government; fiscal deficit; economic growth; transfer payment
分类号:
F812.7
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
为研究地方政府的财政实际能力究竟是否存在一定的赤字，以及公共财政预算赤字决策等问题，将公共预算视作地方政府可通过财政征收力度来进行调控的内生变量，对中央与地方政府的财政收支进行分析。研究认为，在加入地方非公共财政预算收入后，发现地方财政实际能力并不存在赤字反而表现为盈余；与既往文献将公共财政预算收入作为与政府行为无关的外生变量不同，地方政府在制定财政决策时需要同时考虑“公共财政预算总收入与公共财政预算净收入”的短期权衡和“经济增长竞争与财政收入”的长期权衡，使得地方政府在短期权衡中偏向于调节财政征收力度实现最优而非财政预算收入最大化，在长期权衡中偏向于持续调控公共财政预算收入而保持公共财政预算赤字；双重权衡机制会扩大央地财政不平衡，在一定程度上影响中央财政的长期稳健和削弱地方公共财政预算支出增长的可持续性；应该进一步推进财政体制改革，寻找到央地财政关系的新平衡点，以适应新时代发展需求和保障财政能够始终成为经济发展的重大推动力。
Abstract:
In order to study whether the actual fiscal capacity of local governments in China faces a deficit and the issues of fiscal deficit decisionmaking in the public budget, this paper considers public budgetas the endogenous variable which can be adjusted through the intensity of fiscal levy by local governments, and conducts analysis on the financial revenue and expenditure of central and local governments. According to the study, firstly, with the addition of the local nonpublic budget revenue, it is found that there would be a surplus instead of a deficit in the actual fiscal capacity of local governments. Secondly, different from regarding the public budget revenue as an exogenous variable unrelated to the government’s behavior in previous literatures, this paper regards it as an endogenous variable. Based on the new assumption, it is found that local governments have to consider both the shortterm tradeoff of"total public budget revenue vs. net public budget revenue" and the longterm tradeoff of "economic growth competition vs. financial revenue" while making fiscal decisions, which would urge local governments to be partial to moderating the fiscal levy intensity to achieve the optimal fiscal budget revenue rather than the maximum one in shortterm tradeoff, and prefer continuously moderating the public budget revenue to maintain the public budget deficit in the longterm tradeoff. Finally, the double tradeoff mechanism will aggravate the fiscal imbalance between the central government finance and the local government finance, affect the longterm stability of the central government finance and weaken the sustainability of local public expenditure growth to some extent. The paper suggests promoting the fiscal system reform and seeking the new balance point of the fiscal relationship between the central and the local governments, so as to meet the needs in new era and ensure the fiscal system always be the major impetus of economic development.

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更新日期/Last Update: 2020-10-27