[1]陈丝璐,任桐萱,陈妤婕.政治关联与民营企业过度投资[J].长安大学学报(社科版),2018,20(03):58-67.
CHEN Si-lu,REN Tong-xuan,CHEN Yu-jie.Political connection and overinvestment of firms[J].Journal of Chang'an University(Social Science Edition),2018,20(03):58-67.
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《长安大学学报(社科版)》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]
- 卷:
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第20卷
- 期数:
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2018年03期
- 页码:
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58-67
- 栏目:
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经济管理
- 出版日期:
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2018-08-13
文章信息/Info
- Title:
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Political connection and overinvestment of firms
- 作者:
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陈丝璐; 任桐萱; 陈妤婕
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1.华中师范大学 经济与工商管理学院,湖北 武汉 430079;2.澳门科技大学 商学院,澳门 00853;3.澳门科技大学 酒店与旅游管理学院,澳门 00853
- Author(s):
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CHEN Si-lu 1 ; REN Tong-xuan2 ; CHEN Yu-jie3
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1.School of Economics and Business Administration,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,Hubei,China; 2.School of Business,Macau University of Science andTechnology,Macau 00853,China; 3.School of Hospitality and Tourism Management,Macau University of Science and Technology,Macau 00853,China
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- 关键词:
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高铁行业; 政治关联; 民营企业; 过度投资; 双向寻租
- Keywords:
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high-speed railway industry; political connection; private firms; over-investment; bi-direction rent-seeking
- 分类号:
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F276.5;F270;F832.51
- DOI:
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- 文献标志码:
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A
- 摘要:
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在国家“四万亿投资项目”的大力支持下,高铁行业发展极其迅速,基本上覆盖了全国的线路地图。中国正处于经济结构调整阶段,高铁行业暂处于产能过剩的状态,在自身调节的同时,中国政府推出了“高铁外交”的政策帮助高铁行业“走出去”。采用面板数据的分析方法,选取2009~2014年间共64家核心高铁行业民营企业,通过描述性统计分析、数据与模型的选择和检验、回归结果进行实证分析政治关联下民营企业的过度投资问题。研究表明:部分地方政府对于所在辖区经济目标和政绩目标会驱使他们对该地区民营企业的经营决策及行为进行干预,使民营企业的发展投资决策和地方政府的经济预期目标一致,促使民营企业在原本适度发展及投资的基础上进行额外的过度投资;民营企业受到资源、政策等条件限制,为了追求经济利益最大化,通常会积极与当地政府建立政治关联,而过度投资则是企业所付出的政治成本;民营企业的政治关联和过度投资是双向影响的关系,即民营企业和部分地方政府以各自的利益诉求和资源交换为基础,实现了双方的经济和政绩目标。
- Abstract:
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The highspeed railway industry in China has grown quickly due to support from the government’s fourtrillion yuan investment plan and most parts of China are now covered by the highspeed railway network.However,the highspeed railway capacity is growing faster than the economy.To solve this problem,China has now proposed “Highspeed railway diplomacy” to attract more offers of foreign contracts.In this context,this article selects 64 key private firms from the highspeed railway industry between 2009 and 2014 to empirically analyse the problem of overinvestment in private firms with political connections.Using the panel data,through descriptive analysis,data and model chosen and test,regress result analysis.This article finds that first,the local government for district economic and achievements target will impel them to intervene the private enterprises’ behaviour in decisionmaking,which makes private enterprises on additional overinvestment.Second, private enterprises are limited by resources and policies and,in pursuit of economic interests,often actively work with the local government to establish a link with government officials,while excessive investment is the political cost.Third,the influence of political relevance and overinvestment is a twoway relationship between private enterprises and local government,based on their own interests and resources exchange,to achieve both economic and political goals.
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更新日期/Last Update:
2018-09-03