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¡¶³¤°²´óѧѧ±¨£¨Éç¿Æ°æ£©¡·[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:

2017Äê03ÆÚ

Page:

45-56

Research Field:

¾­¼Ã¹ÜÀí

Publishing date:

Info

Title:

The effect of CFO characteristics on cash holdings and the difference in regional marketization

Author(s):

LI Xiao-ling;  GE Chang-fu;  HOU Xiao-tian

School of Business£¬Anhui University

Keywords:

CFO;  cash holdings;  regional marketization;  stock option incentive;  corporate governance structure

PACS:

F275

DOI:

-

Abstract:

Cash holdings Scholars home and abroad made a large number of research on the influencing factors of cash holdings based on tradeª²off theory, pecking order theory, and agency cost theory. However, there is very few literature for the research of the impact of CFO characteristics on the cash holdings of enterprises. Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen Aª²share listed companies¡¯ data from 2006 to 2014 as sample, this paper did an empirical study on the effect of CFO characteristics on the cash holdings and the difference in regional marketization. The result shows that the listed companies with female CFO have lower cash holdings than that with male CFO. CFO¡¯s age is negatively correlated to the cash holdings of listed companies. The older the CFO gets, the smaller the cash holdings of listed companies becomes. The listed companies with the CFO who has more professional qualifications such as public accountants, CPA and economists have more cash holdings than that with the CFO who doesn¡¯t have. The correlation between stock option incentive and cash holdings is significantly positive, but there is no significant correlation between CFO education level and cash holdings. In addition, in the process of different marketization, the impact of CFO characteristics on cash holdings is obviously different in different regions.

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