|Table of Contents|

Changes of security regulation theory, evaluation and enlightenment(PDF)

《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:
2009年01期
Page:
80-85
Research Field:
法学
Publishing date:
2009-03-20

Info

Title:
Changes of security regulation theory, evaluation and enlightenment
Author(s):
GUO Sheng-xuan
1. School of Economics and Management, Northwest University, Xi'an 710069, Shaanxi, China; 2. School of Civil and Commercial Law, Northwest University of Political Science & Law, Xi'an 710063, Shaanxi, China
Keywords:
theory of welfare economy;  theory of regulatory economy;  security market;  security regulation
PACS:
F830.91
DOI:
-
Abstract:
In order to find the right theory for the perfection and innovation of China'ssecurity regulatory mechanism in the ever-changing theories, this paper, with the help ofanalytical method of literature, reviews and evaluates theories of the securityregulation. The analysis shows that the security regulatory theory originates from thepublic interest theory of welfare economics, forms the regulation-interest group theoryunder regulatory economics, and grows into the regulation and legal theory under the lawand economics. Each theory has its own historical limitations and shortcomings, andtherefore theories of security regulation will move towards integration. The viewpoint ofthe regulatory agencies to share legal enforcement powers and the discretionary legislativeauthority under the incomplete law theory is of great significance for the devolopment andimplementation of China's security regulatory powers.

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Memo

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Last Update: 2009-03-20