|Table of Contents|

Choice for travel modes based on the two-level game(PDF)

《长安大学学报(社科版)》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:
2006年03期
Page:
4-7
Research Field:
交通运输与管理
Publishing date:
2006-09-20

Info

Title:
Choice for travel modes based on the two-level game
Author(s):
HE Guo-guang JI Yin-miao LIU Feng-tao
Institute of System Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Keywords:
traffic and transportation engineering planning and managing of transportation travel mode two level game
PACS:
U491
DOI:
-
Abstract:
The relationship between the choice of travel modes and traffic resources configuration is an important problem of transportation theory. Only two types of travel modes, namely, autobus and private car are considered, and a two-level game model has been formulated with the purpose to make reasonable and sufficient use of the limited traffic resources. The upper level of the model aims to maximize the total social profit, which describes the relationship between administrators and travelers; the lower level reflects the game equilibrium of the autobus travelers and the private car travelers. Finally the three-step method is adopted to solve the model. At last the application of the model as well as the algorithm is illustrated by a numerical example.

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Memo

Memo:
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Last Update: 2006-09-20