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“Pigs' Payoffs” model mi provement and the study of the state-owned enterprise'smonitor-incentivemechanism (PDF)

《长安大学学报（社科版）》[ISSN:1671-6248/CN:61-1391/C]

Issue:
2005年01期
Page:
51-54
Research Field:
经济与管理
Publishing date:
2005-03-20

Info

Title:
“Pigs' Payoffs” model mi provement and the study of the state-owned enterprise'smonitor-incentivemechanism
Author(s):
GUO Chao1;  LIJun2
1.Finance DepartmentofShaanxi Province, Xi'an 710002, China; 2.School ofEconomics andManagoment, NorthwestUniversity, Xi'an 710069, China
Keywords:
the theory ofgames;  pigs' payoffs;  the contract;  incentivemechanism
PACS:
F224. 0
DOI:
-
Abstract:
The bad performance of state-owned enterprise relate to the imbadance ofmonitor-incentive betweenmanagers and employees. This paper analyses and improves the“Pigs'Payoffs” model from the theory ofgames, combining the study of the property right school, compare the big pig and the piggy to themanagerand the employee of the state-owned enterprise, and then draws the conclusion thatbuild up the bidirectionalmonitoring-incentiveMechanism between employee andmanager is just the ultimateway to increase the achievementofperformance of the state-owned enterprise.

References:

[1]　盛　乐.论人力资本产权博弈的双因素对经营者行为 差异的解释[J].经济科学,2001,(3):14-22.
[2]　施锡铨.博弈论[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社, 2000.
[3]　张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出 版社,2002.
[4]　王　珺.双重博弈中的激励与行为[J].经济研究, 2001,(8):71-78.

Memo

Memo:
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Last Update: 2005-03-20